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QUARTERLY

the common law remain to plague us because courts have
refused to recognize changing conditions and have followed
judicial formula where a bold and sweeping change
amounting to judicial legislation would have been of the
utmost social benefit. We believe, nevertheless, that those
cases should be confined to that numerous class where
there is no substantial difference of opinion as to the social
desirability of a change. They should be cases where
reasonable men would not differ as to the necessity of a
new policy. When the courts, however, announce a new
policy not based- on previous custom and necessity, which
is, intended to mold the economic development of public
utilities and when the result is not one which is arrived at
by the construction of specific words in legislative enactment, or in determining whether a specific statute is unconstitutional or not, we believe that they have abandoned
the proper field, which is the construction of statutes and
the determination of private rights and have embarked on
a hazardous ventdre of economic experimentation.
In dealing with the acts of Public Utilities Commissions
we prefer the view that courts should give them as free a
hand as is possible under constitutional provisions. In the
absence of an appropriation of property without due process
of law, or mere arbitrary and capricious action on the part
of the Commission the court we believe should let its action
stand. The Commission is certainly a proper forum in which
economic and social arguments may be used. It is a fitting
instrument for economic experimentation. It should be let
alone so far as possible to investigate the economic principle involved in Mr. Hardman's thesis before this principle
is permanently established as part of the judicial law.
-T. W. ARNOLD.

CONTEMPT-EVASION OF CRIMINAL PROCESS AS CONTEMPT
OF COURT.-In a recent case1 the Supreme Court of Iowa deBurtch v. Zench, 200 Ia. 49, 202 N. W. 542, 39 A. L. R. 1349 (1025).
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cided that one who destroyed liquor in order to prevent police officers armed with a search warrant from obtaining
evidence of violation of the prohibition law could ba punished for contempt of court. The court was content to rely
on a quotation from Corpus Juris as authority 2 for this
somewhat unusual decision. The only other case on all
fours with it was decided in 1911 in Arkansas and related
to gambling. 3 There the proprietor of a gambling resort
delayed the officers by refusing to surrender the key until
they had concealed the gambling devices for which the officers were searching.
The Arkansas case was decided upon the inherent common
law powers of a court to punish for contempt. In the Iowa
case the destruction of the evidence was decided to be contempt within a statute providing that illegal resistence to
any order or process made or issued by a court was contempt. The reasoning of both cases is the same, i. e., that
the destruction of evidence is an illegal resistance to a
search warrant aimed at finding that evidence.
The West Virginia statute 4 is substantially the same as
the Iowa statute in that it provides that "disobedience or
resistance * * * * to any lawful process, judgment or
decree or order" of the court is punishable by contempt.
The following questions therefore arise: (1) Is a law
violator who escapes conviction by destroying evidence
sought under a search warrant guilty of resisting an order
or process made by the court? (2) If he is guilty of such
resistance what line of distinction can be drawn between
his act and the act of any criminal who hides from the police?
(3) If an innocent man, through fear, hides from
the police and attempts to destroy evidence which might
incriminate him, may he also be prosecuted for contempt
because he has been offering resistance to a warrant which
is termed a process issued by the court?
In other words, if we accept the Iowa decision as a correct interpretation of a statute or the Arkansas decision
as a correct interpretation of the common law, where will
the line be drawn? What is to prevent the court from assuming the general punishment of criminals without a jury,
2 13 C. J. 43 et Beg.
' Bryan v. State, 99 Ark. 163, 137 S. W. 561, Ann. Cas. 1913A 908 (1911).
BARNES W. VA. CODE, 1923 Ch. 147, §27.
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not for the crime they commit, but for their attempts to
evade the consequences of these crimes.
The idea that obstructing or delaying service or execution
of legal process is contempt is well established.5 However
just what legal process is has not been clearly defined in
this connection. Courts have punished for contempt parties who interfere with officers attempting to levy writs of
attachment, 6 or who prevent the service of a writ of replevin.7 Yet it has also been held that mistreatment of an
officer serving a writ may not be contempt. 8 Contempt
proceedings are not ordinarily allowed against persons who
evade service of subpoena issued for their appearance as
the witness. 9 Though it has been held that evasion of service of summons in a suit may be contempt where it is contended to frustrate orders of court in collateral proceedings
by so doing.'0 It has also been decided that perjury or
false swearing may be punished under certain circumstances as contempt."
The court, in deciding the Iowa case above cited, relied
on these cases without question in making its ruling that a
criminal who evades a search warrant is guilty of contempt
of court.
It should be noted however, that in those cases where
avoidance of legal process was held to be contempt, the
sole purpose of the act was to frustrate the orders of the
court. In the case above cited where service of summons
was contempt, 1 2 it clearly appeared that service was being
avoided to prevent the carrying out of an order issued in a
collateral suit. Without these circumstances avoidance of
service of summons in a civil suit is not contempt.
5 In

re Rice, 181 F. 217. Ann. Cas. 1913A 252 (1911) ; Aaron v. State, 105 Miss.

402, 62 So. 419 (1913) ; In re S., 83 N. J. Eq. 607, 91 At]. 801 (1914) : Alberton v.
The P. . Nevius and The Wide Awake, 48 Fed. 927 (1892) ; People v. Gard, 259 In. 238,
102 N. E. 255 (1913) ; State ez rel. Bruce v. District Court of Second Dist. for Silver
Bow County, 33 Mont. 359, 83 Pac. 641 (1906) ; In re Taylor, 62 N. J. L. 101, 40 Atl.
691 (1898) ; Boren v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 146 Mo. App. 136, 129 S. W. 491
(1910) ; Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780, 45 L. R. A. 310 (1899).
In re Noyes, In re Geary, In re Wood, In re Frost, 121 Fed. 209 (1902). Cf. State
a. Nansen, 132 Wash. 563 232 Pac. 329. When defendant in contempt proceedings had
taken property which was not properly levied on by officer executing writ of attachment. Though he acted in disobedience-of the officer he was not liable for contempt.
State ex yel. Bruce v. Dist. Court of Second Dist. for Silver Bow County, 33
Mont. 359, 83 Pac. 641 (1906).
a Adams v. Hughes, 129 Eng. Rep. 632 (1819).
9 Broderick v. Genessee, 125 Mich. 274, 84 N. W. 129 (1900).
10 In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217 (1911).
11 Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky. 471, 222 S. W. 1085, 11 A. L. R. 337 (1920), where
the court had judicial knowledge of the falsity of the statements.
1 Supra, n. 10.
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The cases where perjury is held to be contempt are
limited to cases where the object of the perjury is to delay
or frustrate some order of the court.'3 Of course it can be
argued that all perjury tends to -obstruct the processes of
the court, yet it has been held that such perjury is contempt
only where the court can take judicial knowledge of the
falsity of the statements and no reasonable doubt on this
question exists. 14 The court cannot decide, on evidence in
a disputed case, the question of perjury and punish for contempt "because a sound public policy requires that such
offender be left to the criminal law."'15 This distinction has
not been closely observed in all cases, particularly those
dealing with bankruptcy,", but it is submitted that it is
sound.
The New York court has held that a defendant who disposed of his property in anticipation of a judgment against
him was not guilty of contempt.17 Why then should one
who disposes of his liquor in anticipation of a possible conviction be guilty of this offense? Considering the questions above outlined it is submitted that no court should
punish the criminal who attempts to avoid arrest, either by
trying to escape or by destroying evidence in a criminal
case where the liberty of the party is at stake. The object
of the destruction of the evidence is not contempt of court
but fear of punishment. If we consider that the purpose of
the power of courts to punish for contempt is to uphold the
respect and dignity of these courts, that purpose is fulfilled
when the summary powers of the courts are exercised on
those offenders who attempt to obstruct their processes for
purposes other than their personal safety. For example,
a man who takes an automobile away from an officer who
is attempting to attach it, is doing something which directly
impairs the prestige of the court because no reasonable man
would attempt, for a mere property or money consideration, to evade the order of the court. However, when we
get into criminal cases what else can society expect of its
criminals than that they will attempt to escape? To call
-: 11 A. L. R. 342-357, Annotation.
14 People v. Stone, 181 111. App. 175 (1913) ; People v. Hille, 192 Ill. App. 139
(1916).
" Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N. J. Eq. 546, 100 AtI. 608 (1917).
1' In re Getkin, 164 Fed. 71 (1908) ; In re Shear, 188 Fed. 677 (1911).
I' Grad v. Tummineli, 168 N. Y. S. 11 (1918).
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such attempt contempt of court is to give the court not only
jurisdiction to punish criminals who may inadvertently be
acquitted, but also innocent men, who through fear or mere
foolishness, attempt to avoid the police.
It is interesting to note that the only two cases where
attempts to escape from criminal process are held to be
contempt are cases connected with offenses which are common, not only to the criminal, but also to the respectable
elements of society. One is a gambling den, the other a
prohibition case.
The Iowa case above cited is of interest in West Virginia
because of the similarity -of the statutes regulating direct
contempts in both states. If a court in West Virginia had
before it the question as to whether it could punish for contempt one who destroyed liquor to evade the consequences
of a lawful search the Iowa case would be a persuasive
authority. We are convinced however that that case is
wrong in principal. The decision ignores the real purpose
of the power of contempt, which is to protect the dignity of
the court, and embarks on the hazardous undertaking of
using that power to enforce the prohibition laws. Such an
attempt will have a negligible effect on prohibition enforcement, and will create an embarrassing precedent in the administration of criminal law.
-T. W. ARNOLD.
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